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NOTE
In Custodia Legis: Implied Warranty of
Habitability Procedure in Missouri
Kohner Properties, Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc)
Connor M. Sosnoff*

I. INTRODUCTION
The common law has changed drastically in its treatment of tenants who
rent their living spaces from landlords. Over the course of the twentieth century, property doctrine has evolved in response to an ever changing society.1
Although early common law failed to recognize the relationship between landlord and tenant as a contractual relationship, modern common law has developed to treat the relationship as such.2 The implication of contractual principles upon the relationship has increased the scope of duties landlords owe tenants in exchange for the tenants’ agreed upon rent.3
The evolution of the law has most notably encouraged landlords to become more responsible for maintaining safe and habitable living spaces for
their tenants. The contractual nature imputed into the relationship between
modern landlords and tenants allows tenants to abandon their leases when the
living spaces are uninhabitable through a doctrine known as constructive eviction.4 However, abandoning leased premises carries serious risks for tenants,
particularly tenants of lower income classes.5 With this in mind, our legal system has developed the implied warranty of habitability, which protects vulnerable tenants by allowing them to remain in possession of unsafe living spaces
while withholding their monthly rent payments.
Kohner Properties, Inc. v. Johnson applies an evolving modern habitability doctrine to a landlord-tenant dispute over unpaid rent.6 The situation in
Kohner is one in which a tenant refused to pay her rent because she asserted
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of

Law, 2020, Layout and Design Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020. Thanks to
Professor Freyermuth for his assistance and feedback, as well as the Missouri Law Review for valuable insight and help.
1. See King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 70–75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
2. Id. at 70.
3. Id. at 69 (discussing the evolution from caveat emptor to the modern doctrine
of the implied warranty of habitability).
4. Id. at 70.
5. Id. at 70–77.
6. 553 S.W.3d 280, 281 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per curiam).
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that her landlord failed to provide her with a habitable living space.7 The ultimate issue assessed by the Missouri Supreme Court involved the propriety of
allowing Missouri circuit courts to compel tenants to pay withheld rent to the
courts, in lieu of payment to the landlord, during the course of litigation.8
This Note addresses whether the judiciary should have the power to compel tenants to pay their rent to the court (“in custodia legis”) as a prerequisite
to asserting a breach of the implied warranty of habitability at trial. Section II
of this Note will describe the relevant facts and the holding of Kohner. Section
III explores the legal background surrounding the implied warranty of habitability and in custodia legis procedures. Section IV describes the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding and rationale. Finally, the Comment Section of this
Note argues in favor of the dissenting opinion, that the use of discretionary in
custodia legis procedures is harmful to the interests of tenants in Missouri.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On October 31, 2014, Latasha Johnson entered into a lease with Kohner
Properties, Inc. to rent an apartment in St. Ann, Missouri.9 Johnson paid a $200
security deposit to secure her lease at a rate of $585 per month.10 Upon moving
into the apartment, Johnson immediately discovered various problems with the
only bathroom, including missing tiles and cracks on the floor.11 Kohner’s
property manager informed Johnson that nothing could be done about the bathroom.12 In November of that year, Johnson noticed a water leak had developed
in the ceiling of the bathroom above the shower and bathtub.13 Mold began
growing on the ceiling, and Johnson called Kohner to report the leak and
mold.14 Over the next few months, Johnson noticed and reported various other
problems with the bathroom and other rooms in her apartment.15 Other issues
that Johnson faced involved her kitchen sink, stove, and range.16 She contacted
the property manager again in February and was told “there was nothing they
could do.”17

7. Id.
8. Id. at 286.
9. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, No. ED 103133, 2016 WL 10998837, at *1

(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2016) transferred to Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553
S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per curiam).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Beginning in March of 2015, Johnson withheld her rent because property
management would not resolve the maintenance requests for the apartment.18
At 2:00 A.M. on March 17, 2015, the bathroom ceiling in Johnson’s apartment
collapsed.19 Although Johnson placed an emergency service request to fix the
ceiling, Kohner’s technician tried to remedy the situation by taping a “black
plastic bag over the hole in the ceiling.”20 Because water eventually collected
in the plastic bag, the bag did not fix the leak and Johnson found herself unable
to get minimal use out of her bathroom.21 Johnson could not safely bathe her
daughter in the bathtub below the collapsed ceiling and was forced to stay at a
hotel for a few nights to bathe.22 Johnson withheld her March and April rent,
and Kohner Properties sued Johnson for the unpaid rent as well as possession
of the apartment.23
Before opening statements were given, Kohner moved to bar Johnson
from asserting either an affirmative defense or a counterclaim based upon
breach of the implied warranty of habitability.24 Kohner argued that Johnson’s
failure to pay her rent in custodia legis25 prevented her from asserting any such
claims.26 This motion was granted, and on May 13, 2015, the Circuit Court for
St. Louis County entered a judgment against Johnson for the unpaid rent, late
fees, attorney’s fees, court costs, and possession of the apartment.27 Although
the circuit court did find as a matter of fact that the hole above Johnson’s bathtub had been inadequately repaired, the court found as a matter of law Johnson
could not assert either an affirmative defense or counterclaim relying on the
implied warranty of habitability because she had not paid her rent in custodia
legis.28 Johnson appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District.29
On appeal, Johnson argued that the trial court erred in barring her from
asserting the implied warranty of habitability as either an affirmative defense
or counterclaim and that her failure to pay rent to the court in custodia legis
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2. Johnson’s young daughter with cerebral palsy could not make use
of the bathtub, as the “mold and air conditions in the bathroom aggravated her daughter’s allergies and irritated her daughter’s eyes to the extent her eyes were beginning to
droop.” Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. “In custodial legis is defined as ‘[i]n the custody of the law’ and is used in
reference to property placed in the court’s charge pending litigation over the property.”
Id. at *2, fn. 3 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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was not “a legal prerequisite to asserting a breach of implied warranty of habitability.”30 Although the Eastern District concluded that it would grant Johnson’s points on appeal and remand her case back to the trial court, the case was
instead transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to Missouri Rule
of Civil Procedure 83.02.31
The Missouri Supreme Court, in a three to two per curiam decision, ruled
in favor of Kohner.32 The Missouri Supreme Court held that circuit courts in
Missouri have the power to require tenants asserting a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability to pay their rent to the court during the course of litigation.33

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Society’s evolution from an agricultural-based, agrarian society to a modern industrial society has prompted concomitant changes in the common law
principles governing property law.34 This Section tracks changes in the law
that have precipitated the discussion of in custodia legis procedures as they
apply to claims for breach of implied warranty of habitability. First, this Section details how the implied warranty of habitability developed and the doctrines preceding it, such as caveat emptor, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and
constructive eviction. Second, this Section explains how courts in some jurisdictions have developed an in custodia legis procedure, along with some of
their stated policy rationales for doing so.

A. The Common Law and the Implied Warranty of Habitability
At early common law, tenants were subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor – buyer beware.35 Under this doctrine, leases were primarily understood as
a rental of the land upon which a residence was built, as the land itself was the
“most important feature of the conveyance.”36 Early common law leases were
considered a “conveyance of an estate in land and w[ere] equivalent to a sale
of the premises for the term of the demise.”37 As such, rent was due “without
30. Id.
31. Id. at *10. Mo. R. Civ. P. 83.02 (Per this rule, cases resolved by “opinion,

memorandum decision, written order, or order of dismissal in the court of appeals” may
be transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court).
32. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per
curiam).
33. Id. at 285. In making its decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri relied on
King. Id. at 282 (referencing King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973)).
34. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 68.
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reference to the condition of the buildings or structures on [the land].”38 Although tenants could negotiate with their prospective landlords, such covenants
were considered “only incidental to the land and independent of the tenant’s
obligation to pay rent.”39 Caveat emptor imposed a duty on the potential tenant
to inspect any property before entering into a lease, as there was no warranty
implied by the landlord.40 At common law, courts traditionally assumed the
tenant and landlord were of equal bargaining power in the transaction, and tenants wishing to have covenants or warranties in their leases could expressly
bargain for them.41 However, even if tenants did enter into covenants with their
landlords for necessary repairs, those covenants were understood as an obligation by the landlord to the land, and thus “independent of the tenant’s covenant
to pay rent.”42
The early common law of real estate leasing carried “harsh results” for
tenants.43 Because of this, courts started to carve out exceptions to these rules
by treating the relationship between landlord and tenant “as if governed by
contract law.”44 One such exception to caveat emptor was the covenant of
quiet enjoyment, a doctrine under the early common law that suspended the
tenants’ obligation to tender their rent where the landlord had physically deprived them of possession of the land.45 Originally, the implied covenant of
quiet enjoyment protected only against physical extrusion,46 but the courts soon
began to consider whether a tenant’s possession could be “molested by something less.”47
Thus, the doctrine of quiet enjoyment was expanded with the creation of
constructive eviction:
A constructive eviction arises when the lessor, by wrongful conduct or
by the omission of a duty placed upon him in the lease, substantially
interferes with the lessee’s beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises. Under this doctrine the tenant is allowed to abandon the lease and
excuse himself from the obligations of rent because the landlord’s conduct, or omission, not only substantially breaches the implied covenant

Id. at 69 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at n. 6 (citing O’Neil v. Flanagan, 64 Mo. App. 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1895)
(“the tenant was not discharged from his obligation to pay rent although the building
was destroyed by fire”).
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Dolph v. Barry, 148 S.W. 196, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912).
46. King, 495 S.W.2d at 70.
47. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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of quiet enjoyment but also ‘operates to impair the consideration for the
lease.’48

The doctrine of constructive eviction was the first rule created by courts
that required landlords to ensure habitability and was designed specifically as
“a substantial breach of a material covenant in a bilateral contract.”49 While
the covenant of quiet enjoyment protected tenants against intrusions from their
landlords, the doctrine of constructive eviction evolved to permit tenants to
abandon their leases upon the mere breach of a duty or substantial interference
with the land, which is now understood as a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability.50
The implied warranty of habitability is a doctrine that has only somewhat
recently received recognition in Missouri.51 The doctrine provides that the
landlord-tenant relationship is contractual, and a landlord’s failure to provide a
habitable living space constitutes a breach of contract.52 The use of this doctrine was thus emblematic of a transition whereupon courts began to recognize
landlord-tenant relationships as contractual relationships, where the duty to
maintain the premises was contractually implied for the landlord.53 In effect,
rent was due to landlords only where the tenant was provided with a habitable
living space.54 Modern courts justify the doctrine by pointing to the difference
in bargaining power between landlords and tenants, the regulatory enactment
of minimum standards of habitability, and tenants’ reasonable expectations of
habitable dwellings.55
In 1973, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, through its
holding in King v. Moorehead, abandoned caveat emptor and applied the implied warranty of habitability to every residential lease.56 The King court summarized and evaluated the progression of the early common law doctrines of
landlord-tenant leases and concluded the implied warranty of habitability
should be read into Missouri real estate leases.57 King involved a suit by a
landlord against a tenant for possession and unpaid rent of a single-family
dwelling in Kansas City.58 The tenant in King refused to pay rent until the

Id. (quoting Dolph, 148 S.W. at 198).
Id. (quoting Dolph, 148 S.W. at 198).
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 75–76. The implied warranty of habitability developed in response to
societal changes, such as the transition from an agrarian society to an urban society.
53. See Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 268–69 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
54. See King, 495 S.W.2d at 75.
55. Detling, 671 S.W.3d at 269.
56. King, 495 S.W.2d at 75.
57. Id. at 69–70, 75.
58. Id. at 67.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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landlord “corrected and abated certain substantial housing code violations.”59
Finding that the tenant sufficiently pleaded a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, the court declared that such pleading was an effective counterclaim and reversed the trial court’s holding in favor of the landlord.60 King
held that tenants asserting a breach of the implied warranty of habitability are
justified in withholding rent until the premises have been restored to a habitable
degree.61
The King court reasoned that “modern housing leases are not purely conveyances of property interests with independent covenants to perform but are
also bilateral contracts.”62 To justify their departure from existing case law,
the court cited policy rationales regarding the ineffectiveness of constructive
eviction in the face of a prolonged housing shortage.63 Per the King court, the
implied warranty of habitability developed in response to this housing shortage, specifically given the shortage’s effects on low income tenants.64 The low
income tenants that were “most likely to resort to [constructive eviction]” often
faced a difficult dilemma: “either continue paying rent for an untenable living
space or abandon the premises.”65 Low income tenants either had to continue
paying rent for subpar property or “abandon the premises and hope to find another dwelling which, in these times of severe housing shortage [was] likely to
be as uninhabitable as the last.”66
The implied warranty of habitability defined in King recognized the duties
of the landlord and tenant as contractual obligations.67 Specifically, the King
court declared that a tenant’s obligation to pay rent “is dependent upon the
landlord’s performance of his obligation to provide a habitable dwelling during
the tenancy.”68
The court also outlined factors to consider for the determination of a
breach of the implied warranty of habitability.69 Whether or not a breach was
material per the King court depended on factors such as “the nature of the deficiency or defect, its effect on the life, health or safety of the tenant, length of

59. Id. The defendant alleged fourteen specific housing code violations such as
“rodent and vermin infestation, defective and dangerous electrical wiring, leaking roof,
inoperative toilet stool, [and] unsound and unsafe ceilings.” Id. at 68.
60. Id. at 79–80.
61. Id. at 77.
62. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, No. ED 103133, 2016 WL 10998837, at *3
(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2016) (referencing King, 495 S.W.2d at 71).
63. King, 495 S.W.2d at 76.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 76–77.
67. Id. at 75.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 76.
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time it has persisted and the age of the structure.”70 The court detailed that
damages should be “reasonably measured by the difference between the agreed
rent and the fair rental value of the premises as they were during occupancy by
the tenant in the unhealthful or unsafe condition.71 Notably, the court in King
also outlined the procedure for withholding rent by a tenant asserting the
breach.72 In dicta, the court cited Javins v. First National Realty for the proposition that tenants withholding rent “shall be required to deposit the rent as it
becomes due, in custodia legis pending the litigation.”73
Explaining its decision, the court noted that modern landlords are likely
to have both a stronger interest in, and a better economic position with respect
to, the property.74 Other policy rationales cited by the King court included
housing shortages, the disparity in bargaining power between landlords and
tenants, changing housing codes, which placed responsibilities upon landlords,
the likelihood that landlords have superior knowledge of the state of the premises, and the benefit of consumer protection laws to the tenant.75 From this
reasoning, the court in King abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor and applied the implied warranty of habitability to all residential leases in Missouri.76
In 1984, the Missouri Supreme Court fully incorporated the holding and
reasoning of King by formally adopting the implied warranty of habitability in
Detling v. Edelbrock.77 In Detling, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized
“the evolution of the common law, the modern acceptance of a lease as both a
conveyance and a contract and the rejection of caveat emptor.”78 The Detling
court articulated that a breach of the implied warranty of habitability may be
shown where there is (1) a lease; (2) development of “dangerous or unsanitary
conditions on the premises materially affecting the life, health and safety of the
tenant; (3) reasonable notice of the defects to the landlord; and (4) subsequent
failure to restore the premises to habitability.”79 Citing King, the court stated
habitability was “measured by community standards, reflected in most cases in

70. Id. The court also explained that minor housing violations should be considered de minimis in regard to the materiality of a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability. Id.
71. Id. (citing Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (N.H. 1971)).
72. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
73. Id. (citing Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, n.67 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).
74. Id. at 71.
75. Id. at 71–72.
76. Id. at 75.
77. 671 S.W.2d 265, 269–70 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds
by Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per curiam).
78. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, No. ED 103133, 2016 WL 10998837, at *5
(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2016) (citing Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 268–69
(Mo. 1984) (en banc)).
79. Detling v. Edelbrock 671 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
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local housing and property maintenance codes.”80 The court also noted that
tenants are required to give notice to the landlord and allow a reasonable time
for the landlord to correct the situation.81 At the time of Detling, seventeen
other jurisdictions had also recognized an implied warranty of habitability in
residential leases.82
Although Detling marked the formal recognition of the implied warranty
of habitability by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1984, some questions remained about its proper application.83 In its adoption of the implied warranty
of habitability, the court in King also echoed support for the in custodia legis
procedure, which originated with Javins.84 However, the in custodia legis requirement in Javins was not necessary for the resolution of King, and thus the
procedure was, at the time of Detling, considered dicta.85

B. In Custodia Legis Procedure
The in custodia legis procedure requires tenants-in-possession who seek
to raise the implied warranty of habitability, as either an affirmative defense or
counterclaim, to pay their rent during litigation either directly to the trial court
or to an escrow account.86 Although King described this process, Missouri
courts dismissed the comment on in custodia legis procedures as dicta because
it was unnecessary to the resolution of the case.87
Other state and federal courts across the country have also considered in
custodia legis as a prerequisite to assert the implied warranty of habitability.88
In a footnote in Javins,89 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit detailed how it believed the in custodia legis requirement
should function, referring to it as an “excellent protective procedure.”90 The
Javins court opined, “if the tenant defends against an action for possession on
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. (citing King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
Id. at 268–69 n. 4.
See Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (per

curiam).
84. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (citing Javins v.
First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n. 67 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
85. See Kohner Props, Inc., 553 S.W.3d at 283.
86. See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n. 67 (D.C. Cir.

1970).
87. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, No. ED 103133, 2016 WL 10998837 (Mo. Ct.
App. Sept. 13, 2016) (citing State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 274 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo.
1954) (en banc)).
88. See e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d 1071 at 1083 n. 67; Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App.
3d 62, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 907 (Pa. 1979); Fritz
v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Minn. 1973).
89. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083 n. 67.
90. Id.
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the basis of breach of the landlord’s warranty of habitability, the trial court may
require the tenant to make future rent payments into the registry of the court as
they become due.”91 The Javins court explained the use and function of the
procedure, one which it noted “would only be appropriate while the tenant remains in possession.”92 The outlined procedure requires the fact finder to make
a “separate finding as to the condition of the apartment” when a party asks for
imposition of the procedure.93
Javins’ recommendation that trial courts be allowed to require an in custodia legis procedure proved influential to courts in other jurisdictions. For
example, in Hinson v. Delis,94 the California Court of Appeals relied upon
Javins in support of the proposition that trial courts have the discretion to enforce an in custodia legis requirement.95 Hinson described the procedure the
same way as Javins: a mechanism for trial courts to require that rental payments
be apportioned among the parties based upon the findings at trial.96
In Fritz v. Warthen,97 the Supreme Court of Minnesota instructed Minnesota trial courts to exercise this power to order tenants to pay their rent to the
court, after evaluating factors such as “the seriousness and duration of the alleged defects, and the likelihood that the tenant will be able to successfully
demonstrate the breach of warranty.”98 Directing trial courts to follow this
procedure, the Supreme Court of Minnesota expanded upon Javins’ in custodia
legis procedure, requiring trial courts to take rent payments from litigants if
such a procedure would be suitable.99 The Fritz court’s application of the in
custodia legis procedure was more extreme than its predecessors, instructing
that trial courts will order the procedure when a question of fact exists regarding
a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, rather than granting discretionary power.100
Missouri appellate courts have not often dealt with the issue of the propriety of the in custodia legis procedure.101 In one instance, the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District cited King in its application of the procedure and found the tenants in question had not paid their rent in custodia
legis.102 There are no other examples of appellate Missouri case law where a
Id.
Id.
Id.
26 Cal.App.3d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71.
213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973).
Id. at 343.
Id. (instructing lower courts that they will take “adequate security therefor if
such a procedure is more suitable).
100. Id.
101. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280, 283 n. 2; see also, Tower
Mgmt., Inc. v. Henry, 687 S.W.2d 564, 565–66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
102. Tower Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d at 565–66.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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tenant remaining in possession was subjected to the in custodia legis procedure.103

IV. INSTANT DECISION
This Section discusses the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Kohner
Properties, Inc. v. Johnson. The court applied relevant precedent to the dispute
between Latasha Johnson and Kohner Properties and held that circuit courts
may use discretion to impose an in custodia legis procedure in disputes over
the implied warranty of habitability. This Section first examines the majority
opinion and rationale, then turns to the dissenting opinion, which argued the
imposition of this procedure was not founded in doctrinal property or contract
law.

A. Majority Opinion
Authored per curiam, the two-part holding by the majority of the Missouri
Supreme Court, as a matter of first impression, ruled that “circuit courts may
exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis to determine whether an in custodia
legis procedure is appropriate.”104 The court found in favor of the landlord,
Kohner Properties, and barred the tenant, Johnson, from asserting an affirmative defense or counterclaim of the implied warranty of habitability because
she failed to pay rent to the circuit court in custodia legis.105 The court affirmed
the circuit court’s judgment, finding the circuit court’s reliance on King proper,
even though the relevant language from King was dicta.106
The court declared that although the in custodia legis requirements as they
pertained to tenants remaining in possession were dicta, King was the prevailing law in Missouri and had been “dutifully followed by our circuit courts for
almost five decades.”107 However, until Kohner, the specific issue of whether
the in custodia legis requirements from King applied to all actions for rent and
possession when the tenant remained in possession of the property had not been
examined by the Missouri Supreme Court.108 Reasoning that “the ‘majority of
the courts which permit rent withholding’ leave the imposition of an in custodia
legis procedure to the sound discretion of the trial court,”109 the majority found

103. Kohner, 553 S.W.3d at 283 n. 2. The Supreme Court of Missouri also noted
that other circuit courts in Missouri have applied the in custodia legis procedure, however no examples were provided. Id.
104. Id. at 285.
105. Id. at 286.
106. Id. at 286–87.
107. Id. at 283.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 11.3
(AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
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that the circuit court did not err in barring Johnson from asserting the implied
warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense or counterclaim.110
The majority opinion expanded its rationale by providing three policy arguments in support of its decision.111 First, citing the dicta in King, the court
stated the process assures money is there for the landlord to remedy the uninhabitable situation.112 The opinion further stated the procedure would effectively minimize the damage to the tenant by encouraging the landlord to make
necessary repairs as soon as possible.113 Second, the majority opinion argued
the status quo was preserved through the in custodia legis procedure.114 The
court described the use of discretionary power as deriving “from a trial court’s
general equitable powers to protect a landlord from the potential loss of income
from his property during a prolonged period of litigation.”115 Third, the court
noted the in custodia legis procedure minimizes the risk to the landlord following litigation, should a case arise where a tenant who is found to owe the landlord outstanding rent payments is “unwilling or unable” to pay them following
litigation.116

B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Patricia Breckenridge, focused
on the lack of “basis in present property law or contract principles” upon which
the in custodia legis procedure was founded.117 Explaining the evolution of the
common law from caveat emptor to the implied warranty of habitability, the
dissenting opinion acknowledged the nature of the bilateral contract, where
“the tenant’s obligation to pay rent is dependent on the landlord’s performance
of the obligation to provide a habitable dwelling.”118 The dissent also evaluated the majority’s use of dicta in its holding, pointing out that although the
majority claimed the dicta had been “dutifully followed by our circuit courts
for almost five decades,” only one prior case required the in custodia legis procedure for its resolution.119
110. Id. at 286–87.
111. Id. at 286.
112. Id. at 282 (quoting King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App.

1973)).
113. Id. (quoting King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
114. Id. at 285 (quoting MMB Assocs. v. Dayan, 564 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. App.

Div. 1991)).
115. Id. (internal citations omitted). The majority opinion also noted that a trial
court is in the best position to assess the merits of the case compared to other courts.
Id.
116. Id. (internal citations omitted).
117. Id. at 288 (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 287 (citing King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973))
(Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
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Judge Breckenridge’s evaluation of the policy implications for allowing
trial courts to require the payment of rents to the court or an escrow account
during ongoing litigation responded to the majority’s argument that the procedure effectively preserved the “status quo” of the contractual relationship between landlord and tenant during the course of litigation.120 She argued the
procedure was unnecessary to safeguard the interests of the landlord because
the landlord was not entitled to the rent at issue until after a “favorable adjudication.”121 Furthermore, Judge Breckenridge argued such a requirement ultimately placed landlords “in a better position than they would be if tenants did
not assert an implied warranty of habitability defense.”122 She additionally
pointed out the inability of the majority to articulate any other types of disputes
in either contract or property law that require any disputed amount to be paid
to the court as a requirement for establishing a legal claim.123 As such, the
dissenting opinion described the procedure as a “financial prerequisite to a tenant’s access to the courts.”124 Lastly, the dissent pointed out a problem inherent
in the circuit court’s perception that the in custodia legis procedure was mandatory in the present case.125 Recommending reversal of the circuit court judgment, Judge Breckenridge wrote that Johnson should be afforded an opportunity “for the circuit court to exercise its discretion in this case,” as it appeared
to the dissenting opinion that the circuit court applied the law as if the procedure was required, rather than discretionary.126

V. COMMENT
This Section discusses why the per curiam majority of the Missouri Supreme Court should have adopted the dissent’s decision and allowed Johnson’s
affirmative defense of breach of the implied warranty of habitability. First, by
allowing courts to discretionarily impose an in custodia legis requirement upon
tenants, the court overlooked and discounted the negative effects suffered by
tenants who have asserted their landlords breached the implied warranty of
habitability, many of whom are low income tenants. Second, the negative effects of this doctrine impose a “financial prerequisite” to our judicial system
and act as a deterrent to claiming a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Finally, the doctrine fails to maximize landlord investment in habitable
properties by minimizing the potential risks of being taken to court.

Id. at 288. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). The procedure was mandatory in this case
as Johnson would not be given an opportunity to argue against the application of the
procedure in her case.
126. Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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In its holding, the majority emphasized the usage of the in custodia legis
procedure as a means of maintaining the “status quo” between the parties in the
landlord-tenant relationship.127 Effectively, the status quo is maintained by the
payment of rent to the court in exchange for the continued tenancy of the property in question.128 But as the dissent notes, the imposition of an in custodia
legis requirement in this circumstance would be unique: the majority could not
“cite to any other action – based in either property or contract – requiring the
disputed amount to be paid into the court as a precondition to asserting a defense or raising a claim.”129
Although this circumstance is unique in the way it relates to a tenant’s use
of a residence, the law should treat this distinction as a necessary protection for
low income tenants. Further, the dissent pointedly stated: “requiring a tenant
to deposit rent as it becomes due prior to adjudication of a landlord’s claim for
rent and possession is a financial prerequisite to a tenant’s access to the courts
to present a claim or defense of a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.”130 This consequence for tenants involved in housing disputes seems particularly shocking and problematic.
A main purpose of implying a warranty of habitability into modern residential leases is to protect low income tenants who have few options. Imposing
even more barriers for low-income tenants to reach the court system to redress
their grievance shocks the conscience. While the circumstances at issue here
are unique, reference to mortgage law principles provides a helpful analogy in
understanding the disparity between the landlord and tenant in terms of bargaining power. Courts sometimes place a financial requirement on borrowers
seeking injunctive relief from their lenders upon a foreclosure of mortgaged
property.131 While some courts require a full tender of the debt amount on the
mortgage132 and others require the borrower to tender the amount the borrower
concedes to be due,133 some “dispense with the tender requirement when the
plaintiff alleges that defect renders the sale void.”134
Foreclosed-upon borrowers are likely experiencing serious financial difficulty. In the case of a borrower seeking injunctive relief against a foreclosure
sale, a tender requirement serves as a financial prerequisite that limits the borrower’s equitable relief and is “objectionable when the [borrower] is requesting
injunctive relief in good faith.”135 While a borrower who has been foreclosed

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 285.
Id.
Id. at 288. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breckenridge, J., dissenting).
Grant S. Nelson et. al., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.23 (6th ed. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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upon would prefer to simply pay their mortgage and avoid the foreclosure process, a tenant living in uninhabitable conditions may likewise prefer to simply
renovate their living space on their own accord.
Although the economically disadvantaged party faces a difficult dilemma
in each scenario, the discrepancy in bargaining power between landlords and
tenants presents an arguably more unfair dilemma to the disadvantaged tenant,
who has not promised to repay over time a large sum of money but has merely
contracted for a tenantable living space. This analogy is particularly helpful
because it highlights that foreclosed-upon borrowers are not always required
to tender outstanding mortgage debt, yet low-income tenants seeking relief
from the implied warranty of habitability may be compelled by the court to
escrow their rent akin to a tender requirement.
One potential reason the procedure may serve as a barrier for low income
tenants is its effect as a deterrent from bringing a lawsuit for breach of implied
warranty of habitability in the first place. Making particular note of the power
disparity inherent in this type of conflict, Judge Breckenridge stated, “such
findings ignore the disparity between tenants and landlords that often exists in
situations in which the implied warranty of habitability is being asserted and
overlook the likelihood that requiring payment of rent as it becomes due acts
as a deterrent to tenants wishing to assert the defense.”136 If a low-income
tenant wishes to assert a breach against their landlord, they could likely make
significant use of the money instead of paying the rent in custodia legis under
this holding. At its conception, the implication of a warranty of habitability
into modern leases served to minimize the instances of constructive eviction,
where tenants simply abandoned the property and were forced to seek other
housing.137 By requiring tenants to make full rent payments to the court in lieu
of the landlord while they assert their housing is unsatisfactory, the benefits of
the doctrine are weakened, and constructive eviction becomes more appealing.
Although the majority argues the procedure preserves the status quo, this holding may in fact make tenants more likely to find themselves constructively
evicted – which would be disastrous for the “status quo.”
The options for tenants living in uninhabitable spaces are limited: tenants
may either find themselves constructively evicted or choose to withhold rent.138
If tenants in Missouri may – at the courts’ discretion – be required escrow their
rent to the court during the pendency of litigation, then they may wish to pursue
other options, such as using that rent money in an effort to find a new living
situation. The in custodia legis doctrine neuters the bargaining power that tenants gain by withholding rent. By withholding their payments, tenants are able
to put pressure on their landlords to make their inhabited space livable. The
law should allow disadvantaged tenants who are forced to live in squalor to
pressure landlords by withholding rent. Granting greater bargaining power to
136. Kohner Props., Inc. v. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d 280, 288 (Mo. 2018) (en banc)
(per curiam).
137. See generally King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
138. Id.
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tenants serves the public policy aim of minimizing instances of abusive and
neglectful landlord practices that lead to such situations in the first place. Instead, by allowing circuit courts to discretionarily rent payments to the court as
a means of minimizing potential risk to the landlord, the law will be less favorable to the neglectful actions that lead to the uninhabitable living situations at
issue.
The Kohner opinion does not specify what factors trial courts should use
to determine whether to exercise discretion in any given case. While the majority opinion is correct that trial courts are “in the best position to assess the
merits of each case,”139 it is unclear what, if any, factors the majority wants
trial courts to consider when determining whether to require rent be paid to the
court. Even though the power to impose these payments may be equitable to
the competing interests of the parties in some hypothetical instances, the granting of such a broad and undefined power to the trial courts poses a threat to the
interests of at-risk and low-income tenants. Without the provision of clear
standards for use in determining which tenants must pay their rent in custodia
legis, Kohner runs the risk of allowing a variety of standards applied in Missouri’s trial courts, which is problematic in its own right. Given the potential
impact of an in custodia legis procedure on at-risk or low-income tenants, careful guidelines should be provided for direction to the trial courts. If courts are
to implement this procedure, such guidelines could instruct courts to consider
various relevant factors, such as the tenants rent amount as compared to their
monthly income.
The legal system should recognize that landlords and tenants are rarely in
equal bargaining positions and the risk of nonpayment of rent is one that should
be borne by the landlord when there is a question of whether tenanted spaces
meet a modern understanding of habitability. When courts force tenants to pay
their rent during litigation, regardless of the habitability of their living space,
this minimizes the risk to the landlord that the tenant will not have the funds
available to pay outstanding rent should the landlord win at trial. Landlords
who must defend against a breach of the implied warranty of habitability
should not receive and do not deserve this protection. As a policy, we should
encourage landlords to invest in their properties and make them habitable.
Shifting the risk of litigation to landlords encourages them to properly invest
in the spaces they offer tenants. The policy advanced by the holding of the
Missouri Supreme Court does not maximize landlord investment into habitable
living spaces and disadvantages low-income tenants.
In effect, tenants who are already suffering unfavorable living conditions
bear the risk of litigation because they are deprived of the time value of their
money when the court holds the money in escrow. The majority is correct in
its discussion of this risk allocation – the procedure minimizes the potential
risk to the landlord. However, the point of the doctrine is to bring tenants –
particularly vulnerable and low-income tenants – to parity in the bargaining

139. Kohner, 553 S.W.3d at 285.
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process with their landlords by requiring habitable living spaces as a prerequisite to “earning” their monthly rent payment.
The dissenting opinion is stronger in Kohner because it illuminates the
point that landlords being sued or countersued for a breach has not “earned”
their rent payment and therefore, has not earned that it be set aside for him in
the meantime.140 Although the landlord could certainly prevail at trial, foregoing an in custodia legis procedure would incentivize landlords to keep their
living spaces unquestionably habitable. Having landlords assume the risk of
nonpayment following litigation could encourage landlords to invest more in
their properties, especially the properties and living spaces of a lower tier or
quality, which may be more likely to be found inhabitable. In short, allocation
of the risk that the tenant will not have money following litigation would serve
as a reason for landlords to ensure they are never brought to court by providing
unquestionably habitable living spaces.
By placing a “financial prerequisite”141 upon tenants asserting a breach of
the implied warranty of habitability, we are not preserving the status quo but
instead granting a windfall to neglectful landlords by minimizing their potential
risk. In doing so, we place some of society’s most vulnerable – low income
tenants – at an increased risk of constructive eviction, effectively negating the
general benefit of the implied warranty of habitability.

VI. CONCLUSION
Kohner Properties, Inc. v. Johnson imposes upon the state of Missouri a
procedure intended to benefit landlords by mitigating their potential risk when
brought to court on a theory of breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
Although the intentions of the majority opinion are understandable in seeking
to preserve the status quo of the relationship between landlord and tenant, the
status quo should be irrelevant when landlords fail to provide habitable living
spaces to their tenants. Landlords are in a superior bargaining position relative
to tenants, and the law has evolved specifically in response to this imbalance.
Placing the burden of paying rent during litigation on a tenant when the landlord is failing to provide a habitable living environment is harmful to low income tenants who have few options. Although the in custodia legis procedure
serves as an effective measure for protecting the interests of the landlord, the
judiciary should seek to instead protect the more vulnerable party during litigation. The procedure not only obstructs the tenant by imposing a financial
prerequisite due to the courts not found in other contract disputes but also reallocates a financial burden onto a party with less economic bargaining power.
The change in the law from caveat emptor through constructive eviction
and the implied warranty of habitability came as a result of our judiciary recognizing and addressing the reality that a power imbalance is inherent in the
landlord-tenant relationship. Rent withholding via the implied warranty of
140. Id. at 288.
141. Id.
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habitability is a valuable bargaining tactic for the disadvantaged tenant. By
giving circuit courts in Missouri the discretionary power to require the payment
of rent to the court, the bargaining power of modern tenants to stand up for
themselves against neglectful landlords is minimized.
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